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In this Inaugural Address, I will (1) compare shadow and
traditional banking, (2) examine shadow banking's efficiencies and
risks, and (3) explore how shadow banking can be regulated to
maximize those efficiencies and minimize those risks. To accomplish
these regulatory goals, I believe we must go beyond the tools of
traditional bank regulation and focus more functionally on regulating
the firms and markets that comprise the shadow-banking network.
To do that, we first need to understand what shadow banking
means.
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I. Defining Shadow Banking
Irrespective of the definition one adopts, shadow banking is
huge. Some estimate that it "rivals the traditional banking system in
the intermediation of credit to households and businesses."' Shadow
banking also has grown rapidly: a Federal Reserve Bank Staff Report
estimated the "gross size of [the industry was] nearly $20 trillion in
March 2008, which was significantly larger than the liabilities of the
traditional banking system,2 while others estimated it at three times
that level-$60 trillion-in December 2011.3 Without a clear
understanding of the scope of shadow banking, however, these
figures remain imprecise.
A. The Scope of Shadow Banking
Economist and investment manager Paul McCulley, widely
attributed as the term's originator, used "shadow banking" to refer to
"the whole alphabet soup of levered up non-bank investment
conduits, vehicles, and structures."4 This roughly describes the world
of structured finance, which creates and utilizes these types of
conduits, vehicles and structures (collectively, "special purpose
entities" or "SPEs").
* C 2012 by Steven L. Schwarcz.
** Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of
Law, and Founding Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center;
schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I thank Dan Awrey, Lawrence Baxter, and
participants in the Boston University Review of Banking & Financial Law
2012 Inaugural Symposium for valuable comments and Shaun Barnes for
invaluable research assistance.
ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT
No.458, Abstract to SHADOW BANKING (2010).
2 Id. at 4-5.
3 See Philip Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks,
REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/12/20/uk-regulation-shadow-banking-idUSLNE7BJOOT20111220
(indicating that the shadow banking sector is a $60 trillion industry).
4 PAUL MCCULLEY, PIMCO, TETON REFLECTIONS: PIMCO GLOBAL
CENTRAL BANK Focus 2 (2007), available at http://media.pimco.com/
Documents/GCB%/ 20Focus%/ 2OSept%/o2007%/o20WEB.pdf.
See generally STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION,
STRUCTURED FINANCE, AND CAPITAL MARKETS (2004). SPEs are
sometimes referred to as special purpose vehicles or "SPVs."
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More recent commentators expand the meaning of "shadow
banking." Federal Reserve economists, for example, have used the
term to refer to "financial intermediaries that conduct maturity,
credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central bank
liquidity or public sector credit guarantees." 6 These intermediaries,
they say, would include "finance companies, asset-backed
commercial paper ('ABCP') conduits, limited-purpose finance
companies, structured investment vehicles, credit hedge funds,
money market mutual funds, securities lenders, and government-
sponsored enterprises." Thus, in addition to SPEs, which this
definition includes by enumerating ABCP conduits, limited-purpose
finance companies and SIVs, this expansion of the term would
include finance companies, such as Household Finance Corp.; hedge
funds, such as BlackRock, Inc.; mutual funds, such as Fidelity
Investments; GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; and many
investment banks.
Even this broader definition of "shadow banking," however,
so far only includes entities. While that limited meaning might
adequately define "shadow banks", "shadow banking" presumably
refers to what shadow banks do. That presumption, however, raises
two questions.
The first question is whether "shadow banking" should refer
to the provision by shadow banks of any financial products and
services, or only to the provision by shadow banks of products and
services ordinarily provided by traditional banks. Some adopt the
latter, more limited meaning.8 I adopt the broader meaning, however,
because the essential element of shadow banking is that non-banks
provide financial products and services. Moreover, the broader
6 POZSAR ET AL., supra note 1, at 11 n.7.
7 Id. at abstract.
'See, e.g, Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng.,
Remarks at a BGC Partners Seminar: Shadow Banking, Financing Markets
and Financial Stability 3 (Jan. 21, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech420.pdf
) ("I am not ... using 'shadow banking' to refer to any old channel for
credit intermediation other than bank lending. . . . Rather, I am interested
this evening in those instruments, structures, firms or markets which, alone
or in combination, and to a greater or lesser extent, replicate the core
features of commercial banks: liquidity services, maturity mismatch and
leverage.")
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meaning is flexible enough to encompass the inevitable evolution of
financial products and services over time.9
The second question is a bit more metaphysical: should
shadow banking-or, at least, the concept of a shadow-banking
network-be limited to the provision of financial products and
services by shadow banks, or should it also embrace the mediums
used by shadow banks to provide those products and services?
Shadow banks primarily provide those products and services through
the financial markets.10 The core of shadow banking, structured
finance," operates principally through these markets because
securitization, the dominant method of structured finance, 2 depends
critically on SPEs to issue securities that satisfy the demands of
capital-market investors. 13 Repo lending, another well-known
example of shadow banking, similarly operates through financial
markets. 14
For these reasons, my address will include financial markets
in the shadow-banking network. I therefore define "shadow banking"
to mean not only the provision of financial products and services by
shadow banks, but also the financial markets used to provide those
products and services. In that context, I recognize the potential for
regulatory overlap when regulated banks actively participate in
9 See id. at 3 (acknowledging that "we [will] confront new variants of
shadow banking in the future").
10 Cf Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008)
[hereinafter Systemic Risk] (observing that the ongoing trend towards
disintermediation increases the importance of financial markets in any
examination of systemic risk). Shadow banking facilitates
disintermediation. See infra Part II.A (discussing disintermediation).
11 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Henry A. Davis, The Definition of Structured Finance: Results
from a Survey, 11 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 5, 7 (2005) (observing that "a large
part of what is considered in today's markets to be structured finance
involves securitization").
3 That ability depends, in turn, far more on the structure of the transaction
and the securities than on the nature of the SPE itself. There are several
reasons for this. For example, bankruptcy remoteness-a key element of
many securitization transactions, depends first on true sale and only
secondarily on the SPE's bankruptcy remoteness. Furthermore, the
acceptability of the SPE's securities to investors depends less on the nature
of the SPE and more on such structural matters as overcollateralization and
credit enhancement.
14 C infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing repo lending).
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shadow financial markets-as is the case in the repo markets." In the
term "shadow banks," I include, in accordance with the
commentary,16 not only SPEs but also finance companies, hedge
funds, mutual funds, investment banks and GSEs."
B. The Characteristics of Shadow Banking
Any discussion of its characteristics must necessarily be
tentative because we lack a concrete definition of shadow banking.
Nonetheless, one can make several basic observations about the
characteristics of shadow banking.
First, while traditional banks tend to be highly regulated,
shadow banks tend to be less regulated. In discussing shadow
banking, the media sometimes focuses on this characteristic. The
recent report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission also
emphasized this characteristic, referring to shadow banking's
"bank-like financial activities that are conducted outside the
traditional commercial banking system, many of which are
unregulated or lightly regulated."1 9
" C( id. (observing that regulated banks are sometimes repo borrowers and
lenders, even though the repo market is a well-known example of a shadow-
banking market); infra note 104 (observing that shadow banking's divergent
components may require divergent regulatory responses).
See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
1 See Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really
Banking?, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 2011, at 8, 9 ("Shadow banking
comprises a chain of intermediaries that are engaged in the transfer of funds
channeled upstream in exchange for securities and loan documents that are
moving downstream.").
18 See, e.g., Richard Cordray: What His Appointment Means for the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, THE DIANE REHM SHOW (Jan. 9,
2012), http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-01-09/richard-cordray-
what-his-appointment-means-consumer-fmancial-protection-bureau
(discussing "financial companies that aren't technically depository
institutions, such as payday lenders or even mortgage companies," and
which lack federal oversight); Ben Protess, Shadow Banking Makes a
Comeback, N.Y. TIMES DEALBoK (May 27, 2011, 1:29 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/ (follow "Shadow Banking Makes
a Comeback" hyperlink) (explaining that the Dodd-Frank Act does not
subject shadow banks to many of the regulations that the Act put into place).
19 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SHADOW
BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 7 (2010), available at http://fcic-
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Second, the fact that shadow banks tend to be less regulated
than traditional banks inevitably means that regulatory arbitrage
drives the demand for shadow banking to some extent. Therefore,
increasing bank regulation will almost certainly increase shadow-
banking demand.20 If driven exclusively by regulatory arbitrage,
shadow banking may not represent a public good. For instance,
regulatory arbitrageurs might use deal structures that carry higher
transaction costs than the regulated alternative, but that offer a net
gain to parties because they avoid regulation.21 Regulatory arbitrage
also disadvantages market participants that lack the wealth, expertise
and, often, political connections to capitalize on arbitrage
opportunities.
Third, to the extent that shadow banking is not driven by
regulatory arbitrage, it may well constitute a public good by helping
to achieve efficiencies. That is, "[w]hile shadow banking activities
certainly include activities which appear to have limited purpose
other than regulatory capital arbitrage, it also includes a range of
intermediation activities which appear to have significant economic
value outside the traditional banking system." 23 These activities
notably include "disintermediation," which, as I will later discuss,
refers to the removal of the need for bank intermediation between the
sources of funds (capital and other financial markets) and the users of
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-reports/2010-0505-Shadow-
Banking.pdf (emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., Halstrick, supra note 3 (observing that "[i]nternational
regulators' efforts to strengthen the financial system by tightening bank
rules may inadvertently serve to boost opportunities for unregulated or
'shadow' financial players."). For an interesting discussion of the political
economy of regulatory arbitrage and deregulation, and the origin of shadow
banking, see Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal
Origins (Aug. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1990816.
21 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEx. L. REv. 227, 275
(2010) ("[W]hen new forms are chosen because they reduce regulatory costs
and increase transaction costs compared to the old structure, we lose twice:
efficiency is reduced by the increase in transaction costs, and the regulatory
burden is shifted onto those who cannot engage in arbitrage."); see also
Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory
Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 240-42 (1997) (describing a dynamic
economic model of the efficiency of derivatives regulate\n).
22 Fleischer, supra note 21, at 280-82.
23 POZSAR ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
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funds (e.g., corporations that operate in the real economy, such as
AT&T or General Motors). 4  These activities also include
decentralization of the provision of financial products and services,
which can increase efficiency but can also increase risk.25
Finally, shadow banking can, if left unregulated, pose
systemic risks to the financial system. Commentators argue, for
example, that "[m]aturity and credit transformation in the shadow
banking system . . . contributed significantly to asset bubbles in
residential and commercial real estate markets prior to the [2008]
financial crisis . . . ." Moreover, to the extent shadow banking
provides short-term funding of long-term capital needs, it creates a
risk of liquidity discontinuities. 27 Although some may regard short-
term funding as a central characteristic of shadow banking,28 shadow
banking can (and does) provide both short- and long-term funding.29
Observers sometimes focus narrowly on short-term funding as a
characteristic because of its potential for harm. In a larger
perspective, however, short-term funding of long-term capital needs
is a problem not of shadow banking per se but of the financial
system.30 Even traditional banks fund themselves through short-term
deposits, with resulting liquidity discontinuities called "bank runs."
Before assessing shadow banking's efficiencies and risks,
it is useful to consider what motivated the development of
shadow banking. I believe the main catalyst was technology. To
some extent, shadow banking delivers more diverse and,
arguably, more innovative financial products than traditional
banking. And while traditional banks have the capacity to
respond, sooner or later, to investor demand for products,
technology has enabled non-bank financial market participants,
such as hedge funds, to compete with traditional banks in
24 See infra Part II.A (discussing disintermediation).
25 See infra Part II.B (discussing decentralization).
26 POZSAR ET AL., supra note 1, at abstract.
27 See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
28 This was a perception, for example, of some of the panelists at the
symposium at which I presented this inaugural address.
29 In securitization transactions, for example, the issued securities often have
long-term maturities.
'0 Cf Morgan Ricks, Visiting Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School,
Presentation at the Review of Banking and Financial Law Symposium on
Shadow Banking (Feb. 24, 2012) (notes on file with author) (arguing that
the instability of short-term "money-like" securities is the central problem
for financial regulatory policy).
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providing these products quickly and at lower cost. Remarking on
this competition, Donald Langevoort wrote
At the risk of gross oversimplification, the presence of
such a high level of institutional demand for
(especially) short-term debt instruments plus the
technological evolution in ways of structuring these
products meant that the work traditionally done by the
banking system gradually moved to Wall Street-
hence it became known as the "shadow banking
system. 31
In addition, a contributing factor to the emergence of shadow
banking has been regulatory arbitrage. Highly regulated banks could
not provide financial products and services as cheaply as could non-
or lightly-regulated shadow banks.32
II. Assessing Shadow Banking
Shadow banking, therefore, can potentially increase
economic efficiency, but also increase risk. I first address
disintermediation, the primary mechanism by which shadow banking
increases efficiency. I then address the decentralization created by
shadow banking, which increases both efficiency and risk.
A. Disintermediation
Shadow banking's disintermediation likely increases
economic efficiency. Banks are intermediaries of funds: they borrow
from depositors and capital market investors the funds that they
subsequently lend.3 As profit-making institutions, banks observe the
3 Donald C. Langevoort, Global Securities Regulation After the Financial
Crisis, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 799, 803 (2010) (emphasis added and citations
omitted).
32 See id. (observing that "[t]he intense safety and soundness regulation for
banks, particularly capital adequacy rules, simply did not apply in the USA
to financial products intermediated by securities firms").
33 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER VINEY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, INSTRUMENTS
AND MARKETS 54-55 (5th ed., 2007). Although commercial banks borrow
some of their funds from depositors, they also borrow a significant portion
of their funding from the capital markets. See id. at 54 (noting that
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fundamental maxim of "buy-low, sell high," with the price of
"buying" funds being the interest rates at which banks borrow and
the price of "selling" funds being the marked-up interest rates at
which they make loans. Essentially, borrowing from a bank,
therefore, is like "buying retail." 34 Disintermediation through shadow
banking, however, can enable companies to borrow without paying
that markup. In securitization transactions, for example, companies
accomplish this by borrowing through SPEs.
Shadow-banking transactions in which non-SPE, profit-
making entities - such as investment banks, finance companies and
hedge funds - intermediate in the place of banks usually produce
fewer efficiencies. Nonetheless, because operating in the non-bank
context likely results in lower regulatory costs than in the traditional
bank context, non-bank intermediation can achieve efficiencies, so
long as regulatory arbitrage problems are adequately addressed.
B. Decentralization
By decentralizing lending, however, shadow banking can
have both positive and negative consequences. Decentralization can
increase consumer welfare by expanding the variety of funds and
financial products available to individual investors, allowing them to
tailor portfolios to their own preferences. A decentralized financial
commercial banks "are no longer dependent on their deposit base for
lending" because they can typically borrow sufficient funds from domestic
and international capital markets to meet their forecast loan demands).
3 Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Structured Finance, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 4) (on file with author).
35 SPEs do not ordinarily charge a profit. See, e.g., Committee on
Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 Bus.
LAW. 95, 132 (2000) (observing that SPEs are not intended to profit); Gary
B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and
Securitization 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No.
05-21, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=713782 (observing that SPEs "have no purpose other than the
transaction(s) for which they were created").
36 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, A Welfare Comparison of
Intermediaries and Financial Markets in Germany and the U.S., 39 EUR.
ECON. REV. 179, 189 (1994) (comparing the decentralized U.S. financial
system to Germany's bank-dominated financial system).
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system also may be more robust in the face of negative shocks.3 If
losses were distributed among many small financial institutions,
some firms would be able to fail without threatening market
stability.38 In addition to helping reduce the size of firms,
decentralization can also mitigate the "too big to fail" problem.
Decentralization, however, also can increase risk. For
example, market failures may occur more frequently in shadow
banking than in the traditional banking system, increasing systemic
risk because uncorrected market failures can lead to inefficiencies in
the allocation of capital within the financial system and can
contribute to systemic failures.3 9 Moreover, as I explain below,
shadow banking might increase the likelihood that systemic risk will
be triggered. And although it is less clear, shadow banking also may
facilitate the transmission of systemic risk.
Shadow banking might increase the likelihood that systemic
risk will be triggered by making panics, which often serve as the
trigger that commences a chain of systemic failures, 40 more likely.
Thus, Professor Dan Awrey argues that, implicitly due to
decentralization, shadow banking creates market fragmentation,
interconnectedness and opacity, 41 which make it difficult for market
37 Cf Haistrick, supra note 3 (observing that "shadow banks may now play
the role of white knights for lenders trying to offload risky assets to comply
with European regulatory capital targets by the middle of 2012").
38 For instance, the FDIC managed the vast majority of the more than 400
bank failures since 2008 without generating negative feedback effects in the
financial system. See Complete Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.
3 In Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and
Limits of Law, 2012 Wis. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-12),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty scholarship/2510/, I
argue that four types of market failures are inherent in the financial system
overall and show how these market failures can contribute to systemic
failures. For example, information failure, principal-agent failure and
incentive failure could, individually or in combination, cause one or more
large firms to overinvest, leading to bankruptcy. Id (manuscript at 4-8, 9-
12). Rationality failure could cause prices of securities in a large financial
market to collapse. Id. (manuscript at 8-9).
40 See Systemic Risk, supra note 10, at 199-201 ("The classic example of
systemic risk in this context is a "bank run," in which the inability of a bank
to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn causing other banks
or their creditors to fail.").
41 Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern
Financial Markets 15 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series,
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participants to effectively process information.42 This allows risks to
accumulate unnoticed and unchecked.4 3 Market participants panic
when hidden risks suddenly become apparent.4 4
Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick also argue, although for
different reasons, that shadow banking might increase the likelihood
that systemic risk will be triggered.4 5 They contend that certain short-
term shadow-banking activities, such as repo lending, can create the
shadow-banking equivalent of bank runs.46 In the recent financial
crisis, for example, the precipitous decline in the value of mortgage-
backed securities used as collateral for short-term repo loans
Research Paper No. 49/2011, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3 /papers.cfm?abstract id=1916649 (arguing that these factors make
shadow banking especially prone to endogenous shocks); see generally Jon
Danielsson et al., Endogenous and Systemic Risk, in QUANTIFYING
SYSTEMIC RISK (forthcoming 2013), available at http://www.riskresearch.
org/files/JD-HS-JZ-37.pdf.
42 See Awrey, supra note 41, at 9-10 (defining complexity as a function of
information costs and bounded rationality).
43 12-13 (describing an actor's tolerance for complexities presented
in shadow banking as a function of several variables inherent in the shadow
banking system). Awrey argues that these pathologies may lead to
inefficient contracting among market participants, as well as to "fraud,
misconduct and other opportunistic behavior" by financial institutions. Id at
52.
44 See id. at 27-30 (arguing that several characteristics of financial markets
"generate significant information costs and set us on a collision course with
our own bounded rationality"); Danielsson et al., supra note 41 (manuscript
at 4-6) (" [T]he distinguishing feature of crisis episodes is that they seem to
gather momentum from the endogenous responses of the market participants
themselves.").
45 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System
1 (Oct. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Shadow Banking],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947. The above observations of
Professors Gorton and Metrick should be placed into perspective, however.
Shadow banking also provides significant long-term funding, which does
not have the impact they describe. Supra note 29-30 and accompanying text.
Moreover, short-term funding of long-term capital needs is a larger problem
of the financial system. Supra note 30 and accompanying text.
46 See Shadow Banking, supra note 45, at I ("When this quiet period finally
ended in 2007, the ensuing panic did not begin in the traditional system of
banks and depositors, but instead was centered in a new "shadow" banking
system.").
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prompted repo lenders to demand additional collateral.47 Gorton and
Metrick maintain that these demands approximated bank runs-in
which panicked depositors withdraw funds from their banks-to the
extent bank repo-borrowers were forced to sell assets to generate the
additional collateral.48 These forced asset sales also further depressed
asset prices, creating a shock that spread rapidly through the
interconnected financial system, impacting shadow-banking entities
(like SIVs and money-market mutual funds) that relied on short-term
debt.49
The net impact of shadow banking on the transmission of
systemic risk is less clear than its impact on triggering systemic risk.
It probably is not feasible to identify all systemic risk transmission
mechanisms in advance. Consider, however, Professor Iman
Anabtawi and my description of the impact of shadow banking on at
least one such mechanism.o We argue that two otherwise
independent correlations can combine to transform localized
economic shocks into broader systemic crises. The first is an intra-
firm correlation between a firm's financial integrity and its exposure
to risk from low-probability adverse events that either constitute or
could lead to economic shocks. The second, which is more relevant
to shadow banking, is a system-wide correlation among financial
firms and markets.
Because it uses financial markets to provide products and
services and also increases interconnectedness, shadow banking
might increase the system-wide correlation among financial firms
and markets. To that extent, shadow banking could increase
47 Id. at 15; see also Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking
and the Run on Repo 23 (Int'l Ctr. for Fin, at Yale Sch. Of Mgmt., Working
Paper No. 09-14, 2010) [hereinafter Securitized Banking], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1440752 (arguing that
these demands were caused primarily by opacity about the exposure of
different borrowers to the flagging real estate market and the value of
borrowers' collateral in the event of defaults).
48 Shadow Banking, supra note 45, at 15.
49 Id at 15-16; see also Steven L. Schwarcz Regulating Complexity in
Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 232-33 (2010) [hereinafter
Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets] (discussing information
uncertainty through the example of mark-to-market accounting and margin
calls by broker-dealers).
50 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2011).
5i See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing that correlation).
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systemic risk transmission.5 2 On the other hand, by increasing the
number of financial firms and diversifying their functions,53 shadow
banking might actually diminish the correlation among such firms,
thereby reducing systemic risk. There is insufficient information to
determine which effect will predominate.54
Thus, shadow banking operates as a double-edged sword by
increasing both efficiencies and risks. I next examine how regulation
can maximize those efficiencies and minimize those risks.
III. Regulating Shadow Banking
Because of the potential to increase efficiency, regulation
should not necessarily be focused on limiting shadow banking per se.
Instead, regulation should be focused on maximizing efficiencies and
minimizing shadow banking's potential to increase risk.55
A. Regulation Focused on Maximizing Economic
Efficiency
Regulation can maximize economic efficiency by correcting
"market" failures.56 In our case, the "market" is the entire non-bank
network - the financial firms (whether SPEs or profit-making
entities) and markets in which they operate - that comprises shadow
banking. At least four types of partly interrelated market failures can
occur within that network: information failure, rationality failure,
52 See Hyun Song Shin, Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis
Financial System 9 (Bank For Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 304,
2010) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work304.pdf (arguing that when
financial intermediaries draw on a limited pool of external funds, expanding
balance sheets inevitably leads institutions to transact with one-another,
deepening interconnectedness).
5 With shadow banking, financial firms are no longer primarily banks but
also SPEs, finance companies, hedge funds, mutual funds, investment banks
and GSEs. See POZSAR ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-5; see also supra text
accompanying note 9.
54 C( Danielsson, supra note 41 (manuscript at 2) (attempting to theorize
which effect will predominate).
5 For a critical discussion of the rationale of financial regulation generally,
see EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS:
THE LAW, THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS (2012).
See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 49, at 262-
64 (providing examples of where regulation can be effective).
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principal-agent failure and incentive failure." Although none of these
failures is unique to shadow banking, all can be exacerbated by
shadow banking's complexity.
1. Information Failure
The shadow-banking network is incredibly complex.5 8
Complexity can undermine disclosure,5 9 which has been the chief
regulatory response to information failure.60 Although the Dodd-
Frank Act puts great stock in the idea of improving disclosure' 1 I
fear its efficacy will be limited. Some parts of the shadow-banking
network are so complex that even some experts view them as
incomprehensible.62
One question, therefore, is whether regulation should attempt
to simplify or standardize shadow banking to minimize its
complexity. One of the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act, for example, is
to standardize the portion of the shadow-banking network involving
63derivatives transactions. But standardization can backfire.
5 Schwarcz, supra note 39 (manuscript at 4-12) (arguing that these four
types of market failures are inherent in the financial system overall).
58 For a general discussion of information failure resulting from complexity,
see Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 49, at 238
("Uncertainty can cause a variety of financial-market failures, most
obviously impairing securities market disclosure.").
59 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2008) [hereinafter Disclosure's
Failure] (discussing the failure of subprime mortgage disclosure due to the
complexity of the market).
60 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 31, at 803 (observing that "[r]egulation
remained largely disclosure-oriented on the sell-side, even as the products
increased in complexity"); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1197 (1999) (discussing the general purpose of disclosure in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933).
6i See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 124 Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) [hereinafter
Dodd-Frank Act] (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 225b) (requiring additional
disclosure).
62 See, e.g., David Barboza, Complex El Paso Partnerships Puzzle Analysts,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at CI (describing how "one industry giant, the
El Paso Corporation, is growing ever more reliant on deals [that use SPEs]
so complex that securities experts call them incomprehensible").
6 Dodd-Frank Act § 723 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2) (requiring many
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Standardizing derivatives transactions, for example, might
inadvertently increase systemic risk by concentrating derivatives
64
exposure at the clearinghouse level. The overall economic impact
of standardization is also unclear because standardization can stifle
innovation and interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the
efficiencies that arise when firms craft financial products tailored to
65the particular needs and risk preferences of investors.
The Dodd-Frank Act also attempts to reduce information
failure in the portion of the shadow-banking network involving
66
securitization transactions. Sellers of securitization products are
required to retain a minimum unhedged position in each class of
securities they sell, thereby ensuring sellers have so-called "skin in
the game."6 7 This too can backfire. By retaining residual risk portions
of certain complex securitization products they were selling,
underwriters who did not fully understand those products may have
fostered false investor confidence, contributing to the 2008 financial
crisis."
Therefore, in the shadow-banking network, some amount of
information failure will be inevitable.
derivatives to be centrally cleared through clearinghouses).
64 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1395.
65 See id. ("[S]tandardization would be disruptive to customized transactions
that yield efficiencies in risk bearing.")
66 I use securitization and derivatives as examples throughout this Address,
consistent with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's preliminary staff
report. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 4 (referencing
shadow banking's dominance in the "markets for securitized products,
structured products, commercial paper, asset backed commercial paper,
repurchase agreements, and derivatives.").
67 See Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 1(c)(1))
(directing the Securities and Exchange Commission to require sponsors of
asset-backed securities to retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the
underlying assets). A recent Federal Reserve Bank staff report identifies this
credit-risk retention as one of the most important "aspects of proposed
[Dodd-Frank Act] rules in light of shadow banking." TOBIAS ADRIAN, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 533, Abstract to DODD-FRANK
ONE YEAR ON: IMPLICATIONS FOR SHADOW BANKING (2011).
See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 49, at 241-
42 (referring to this as a "mutual misinformation" problem).
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2. Rationality Failure
69Humans have bounded rationality. Moreover, the more
complex something is, the less certain we are about it and the harder
it is to understand. We then tend to focus on the simpler and more
straightforward elements with which we are familiar.n We also tend
to believe what we want to believe .
This helps to explain why, in light of the complexity of
shadow banking, market participants have sometimes acted without
full understanding. For example, investors were prepared to believe,
based on mathematical models that they did not fully understand, that
the investment-grade rated securities issued in highly complex
second-generation securitization transactions, offering much higher
returns than other similarly rated securities, represented good
investments even though they were at least partly backed by
69 See Awrey, supra note 41, at 9 n.24 (quoting OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 45 (1985)) ("Bounded rationality
is a semi-strong form of rationality in which economic actors are assumed to
be 'intendedly rational, but only limitedly so';).
0 See id. at 13 (arguing that "our tolerance for complexity is not infinite").
1 See id. (conceptualizing a "complexity frontier" beyond which "actors
will be forced to employ heuristics as a second-best means of understanding
a particular set of facts or state of the world").
72 Cf J. Barkley Rosser Jr., Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian
Perspectives on Uncertainty and Expectations, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN
ECON. 545, 554-57 (2001) (arguing that uncertainty leads to self-fulfilling
mistakes).
73 These transactions included securitizations of collateralized-debt-
obligation securities, or "ABS CDO" transactions. See, e.g., David Milliken
& Richard Barley, ABS CDOs, at heart of crisis, may disappear, REUTERS
(April 1, 2008, 1:37 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/04/01/bis-
assetbackedsecurities-idUKLO161391420080401 ("The use of credit
derivatives in fact allowed more exposure to be created than the amount of
underlying bonds issued"); Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of
Structured Finance, 23 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2009) (finding that
complex securitization transactions such as collateralized debt obligations
("CDO"s) amplified the errors in evaluating the risk of the underlying
securities); David Reilly, Center of a Storm: How CDOs Work, WALL ST. J.,
June 23, 2007, at Bl ("CDOs have generated debate because they are
complex, and pose a risk because they are several steps removed from the
actual asset, or debt, that is being packaged").
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subprime mortgages. Furthermore, many of these mathematical
models were, at best, only rough approximations.
3. Principal-Agent Failure
Commentators widely acknowledge this type of principle-
agent failure insofar as it involves conflicts of interest between
managers and owners of firms. At least in the shadow-banking
network, however, the more serious conflict occurs within the firm:
secondary managers, such as investor analysts and investment-bank
vice presidents, are almost always paid under short-term
compensation schemes, misaligning their interests with the long-term
interests of the firm.75 Although this intra-firm principal-agent failure
is not unique to shadow banking, the complexity of shadow banking,
combined with the very technology that enables shadow banking to
thrive, can exacerbate the failure.n
74 THOMAS S. Y. Ho & SANG BIN LEE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO FINANCIAL
MODELING: APPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE FINANCE,
RISK MANAGEMENT, AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 348-49 (2004)
(discussing Monte Carlo simulations, which condition prepayment risk upon
hypothetical interest rate fluctuations); see also Advanced Analytics, Inc. v.
Citigroup Global Markets., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 3531(LTS)(HBP), 2008 WL
2557421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2008) (describing as "complex" the
computerized process used to estimate prepayment risk); Regulating
Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 49, at 217 (describing the
complexity of financial models); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open
Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the
Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 127, 170-71 (2009) ("These
models, like any other financial or scientific models, make simplifying
assumptions about market behavior in order to generate predictions in the
face of complexity.").
7 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem
of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460
(2009) [hereinafter Conflicts and Financial Collapse] ("The conflict centers
on compensation. Secondary managers are typically compensated for
performing their assigned tasks, without regard for the long term
consequences of the tasks to their firms.").
76 See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 803 (discussing how technology
allowed traditional banking activities to move to Wall Street).
7 See Conflicts and Financial Collapse, supra note 75, at 461-65 (stating
that the increasing complexity of financial markets makes it more likely that
there will be a conflict between secondary managers and their firm).
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To prevent this principal-agent failure, firms could pay
managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term
compensation schemes, e.g., deferred compensation based on long-
term results.78 In practice, however, that solution must overcome a
collective action problem: firms that offer their secondary managers
longer-term compensation may not be able to hire as competitively as
firms that offer more immediate compensation. 7 9 Regulation may be
needed to solve this collective action problem not only within nations
but also across nations, because good secondary managers can work
in financial centers worldwide.
4. Incentive Failure
I have observed that technology has enabled the shadow-
banking network to produce more diverse and innovative financial
products than traditional banking.so In securitization transactions, for
example, these products often include securities that allocate the
return to investors based on finely calibrated risk levels that are
intended to meet specific investor risk appetites. This can be
structured in various ways, such as through tranching, which
allocates repayment to different classes of securities that have
different repayment priorities; or through asset stripping, which
allocates repayment to classes of securities from the specific cash
flows of underlying financial assets (such as principal-only or
interest-only securities). Advanced technology, including
computerization, facilitates this by making it possible to track the
allocated cash flows.
This enables investment risk to be finely dispersed, and, in
theory, such investment diversification is beneficial. However, risk
sometimes can be marginalized by becoming so widely dispersed
that rational market participants individually lack the incentive to
monitor it.8 ' Under-monitoring caused by this incentive failure
71 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIz. L.
REV. 127, 158 n.145 (2009) (giving an example of one firm's attempt at
deferred compensation).
79 See, e.g., id. at 157-58 (arguing that financial institutions have had trouble
balancing the discouragement of excessive risk-taking against the need to
create profit-maximizing incentives and preferences).
8 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/
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appears to have contributed, at least in part, to the 2008 financial
crisis." The problem of incentive failure may be difficult to solve,
however.83
In short, shadow banking can exacerbate market failures.
Regulation can help to control, but cannot completely eliminate those
failures.84 On the other hand, shadow banking might provide a social
good, notwithstanding its market failures, because it brings positive
attributes to the financial system, such as disintermediation and
abstract 1721606 ("Risk can even be so widely dispersed that rational
investors individually lack the incentive to monitor.").
82 See Jean-Claude Trichet, President, Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech before the
Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference (Nov. 13, 2008) (transcript
available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/spO8113 _.en.
html) (arguing that "the root cause of the [financial] crisis was the overall
and massive undervaluation of risk across markets, financial institutions and
countries"); Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-
t.html?pagewanted all ("All the incentives - profits, compensation, glory,
even job security - went in the direction of taking on more and more risk,
even if you half suspected it would end badly. After all, it would end badly
for everyone else too.").
83 For example, regulation could require-perhaps for certain large
issuances of complex securities-that a minimum unhedged position be
held by a single sophisticated investor in each class of securities.
Marginalizing Risk, supra note 81, at 21-26. Regulatory attempts to limit
risk dispersion would have tradeoffs. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act requires
securitization sellers to keep "skin in the game" by retaining risk in the form
of at least a five percent unhedged vertical slice of risk. Dodd-Frank Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 941(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1891 (2010) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 1(c)(1)). Problematically, such retention would only
mitigate conflicts between the parties retaining and those taking on the risk,
not between financial market participants and the non-financial market
participants who bear the burden of externalized risk in a systemic collapse
of the financial system. Marginalizing Risk, supra note 81, at 21-26; cf
Kevin Villani, Risk-Retention Rules Set Up the Private Investor for Failure,
AM. BANKER (Aug. 29, 2011, 3:06 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/
bankthink/QRM-qualifying-residential-mortgage-risk-retention-housing-
private-investor-1041645-1.html (arguing that lack of "skin in the game"
was not responsible for financial institutions' "astronomical leverage").
84 Although regulation cannot eliminate market failures completely, even
within the broader financial system, Schwarcz, supra note 39 (manuscript at
28), there might be more market failures in shadow banking and they might
be harder to control.
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increased efficiency." The net effect of balancing these failures and
benefits is, at present, indeterminate.
B. Regulation Focused on Minimizing Systemic Risk
I also have observed that regulation should be focused on
minimizing shadow banking's potential to create systemic risk.
Specifically, shadow banking might increase that potential by
increasing the likelihood that systemic risk will be triggered and,
although less clear, by increasing the transmission of systemic risk.
Shadow banking may increase the likelihood that systemic
risk will be triggered by making panics more likely.86 Targeted
regulation probably is not feasible to reduce that likelihood because it
is impossible to identify all the causes of panics. Furthermore,
except in the context of particular fact patterns," it is difficult to see
how regulation could directly reduce shadow banking's
fragmentation, interconnectedness and opacity, which increase the
potential for panic.
Regulation could indirectly reduce fragmentation,
interconnectedness and opacity, however, by limiting the factors that
give rise to shadow banking. It would almost certainly be futile, if
not counter-productive, to try to impose regulatory limits on
technology, the first such factor. 90 Therefore, if there is a regulatory
solution, it lies with limiting regulatory arbitrage, the other factor
giving rise to shadow banking.9'
Regulatory arbitrage could be limited either by regulating
traditional banks less or by regulating shadow banks more.92 At least
currently, it does not appear to be politically feasible to regulate
8 See supra Part II.
8 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
8 See Systemic Risk, supra note 10, at 211-13 (arguing "attempts to regulate
systematic risk are imperfect and messy").
81 See, e.g., Shadow Banking, supra note 45, at 1 (proposing repo-collateral
requirements to reduce information problems).
89 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
91 Id.
92 Recall that shadow banks are SPEs, finance companies, hedge funds,
mutual funds, investment banks and GSEs. Supra notes 16-17 and
accompanying text.
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traditional banks less. If anything, the trend appears to be in the
opposite direction.94 On the other hand, there does appear to be
sentiment toward regulating at least some shadow banks more. For
example, the Dodd-Frank Act subjects non-bank financial firms that
are designated as systemically significant to enhanced prudential
regulation, including capital requirements, limits on leverage and
short-term debt, liquidity requirements and increased regulatory
disclosures."
93 Cf Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
[G20], Communiqud of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
of the G-20, at 2 (2011), available at http://g20mexico.org/
images/stories/canalfinan/docs/02comu.pdf (resolving to "ensure that banks
are adequately capitalized and have sufficient access to funding to deal with
current risks.").
94 See Halstrick, supra note 3 (observing that the consequences of increased
bank regulation will be a growth in shadow banking). Several observers
believe that the Dodd-Frank Act may actually fuel the growth of shadow
banking by increasing the regulatory burden on the traditional banking
sector. See Eugene Ludwig, Shadow Banking Will Flourish as Dodd-Frank
Squeezes Banks, AM. BANKER: BANK THINK (July 19, 2011, 5:22 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/shawdow-banking-system-
Dodd-Frank-Ludwig-1040318-1.htmI ("[T]he shadow banking sector has
become more attractive due to the virtual lack of regulatory increase it has
experienced .... ); Stephen Gandel, Is Dodd-Frank Reviving the Shadow
Banks?, TIME (Jun. 27, 2011), http://business.time.com/2011/06/27/is-dodd-
frank-reviving-the-shadow-banks/ ("[I]t appears, shadow banks . . . seem to
be making a come back."); cf Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, Brookings Panel on Economic Activity:
Comments on "Regulating the Shadow Banking System" (Sept. 17, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/tarullo201009l7a.htm) ("[M]ore will need to be done in this area,
particularly as new constraints applicable to large regulated institutions push
more activity into the unregulated sector.").
95 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1403
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325(b)) (providing a list of prudential
requirements). The Group of Thirty also recommends that money-market
mutual funds be forced to choose between becoming "special-purpose
banks" subject to prudential regulation and government insurance (and
having access to central bank liquidity), and investing only in stable, low-
risk assets and abandoning guarantees to investors of being able to withdraw
their funds "on demand at a stable" net asset value. GROUP OF THIRTY,
FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR STABILITY 29 (2009), available at
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial Reform-A Framework
forFinancialStability.pdf. Gorton and Metrick adopt this proposal in their
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Efforts to increase the regulation of shadow banks must
grapple with the question of whether the regulation optimally
minimizes the risk of systemic harm while preserving shadow
banking's efficiency. Some have argued, for example, that leaving
the regulation of systemically significant firms to the discretion of
the Financial Stability Oversight Council 9 6 could create a "boundary
problem" in determining which firms fall into the enhanced
prudential regulatory regime, thereby creating new opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage.9 I have also queried in another context whether
regulating systemically important firms, such as by limiting financial
leverage, can reduce systemic risk at the cost of impairing
efficiency.98
There may be an even more targeted regulatory approach
that would reduce the systemic impact of shadow banking while
preserving shadow banking's efficiency: protecting directly against
systemic consequences that could result from shadow banking. 99 One
way to do this would be to limit the transmission of systemic risk
resulting from shadow banking. Chaos theory holds that in complex
engineering systems - and, I have argued, also in complex financial
systems - failures are almost inevitable. 100 Therefore, regulatory
own recommendations for regulating shadow banking. Shadow Banking,
supra note 45, at 20. Net asset value, often abbreviated "NAV," is usually
$1.00. If a fund's NAV falls below $1.00, the fund is said to "break the
buck." Gorton and Metrick also suggest new limits for repo transactions,
including a licensing requirement for non-bank entities seeking repo
funding, strict quality requirements for collateral, position limits and
mandatory overcollateralization. Shadow Banking, supra note 45, at 23-24.
96 Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1))
(giving the Financial Stability Oversight Council the power to determine
that a U.S. nonbank financial company can be supervised).
97 Rosa Maria Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability, 6
CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 197, 209-10 (2011).
98 Systemic Risk, supra note 10, at 211, 240.
99 See id. at 240-43 (discussing other possible regulatory measures, such as
ensuring liquidity through a liquidity provider of last resort).
100 See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 49, at 248-
49 (arguing that "failures are almost in evitable in complex systems"). One
aspect of chaos theory is deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which
recognizes that the more complex the system, the more likely it is that
failures will occur. Thus, the most successful (complex) systems are those
in which the consequences of failures are limited. In engineering design, for
example, this can be done by decoupling systems through modularity that
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remedies should focus on breaking the transmission and limiting the
consequences of these failures.'0' In other contexts, I have shown
how regulation could accomplish this, such as by ensuring liquidity
to systemically important firms and markets, and by privatizing
sources of liquidity in order to help internalize externalities and
motivate private-sector monitoring. 102
IV. Conclusions
Due to regulatory arbitrage and the increasing technological
ability of non-banks to compete with traditional banks in providing
financial products and services, shadow banking seems here to stay. I
therefore have focused on how shadow banking should be regulated
to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its risks.os
helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will
systemically trigger a failure in another part.
101 See id. (discussing the advantages of modularity in a complex system).
102 Schwarcz, supra note 39 (manuscript at 29).
103 As this article was going to press, I reviewed a new paper by two Federal
Reserve economists on regulation of shadow banking. Tobias Adrian &
Adam B. Ashcraft, "Shadow Banking Regulation," Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Staff Report No. 559 (Apr. 2012), available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr559.pdf. Their paper
essentially argues that (i) shadow banks are inherently fragile because they
engage in maturity transformation, thereby exposing themselves to rollover
risk without having central bank safety nets; (ii) shadow banks therefore
contracted for what was thought to be the equivalent: liquidity and credit put
options with traditional banks; (iii) because of neglected risks (such as
failure to see correlations, underappreciated agency problems, and long
intermediation chains that obscured information), traditional banks
underpriced the risk of these liquidity and credit arrangements and thus
entered into too many of them (which ultimately required tapping public
funds to help avoid traditional bank failures). Therefore, (iv) regulatory
reform should focus on increasing the transparency, and thus enabling more
appropriate pricing, of shadow-bank liquidity and credit arrangements. As
economists, Adrian and Ashcraft focus on pricing-as do I in analyzing
regulation focused on maximizing economic efficiency (see supra Part
Ill.A). I conclude, however, that regulation cannot correct all the market
inefficiencies. See supra note 85 & accompanying text ("Regulation can
help to control, but cannot completely eliminate those failures."). For that
reason, I argue., regulation aimed at increasing transparency and enabling
more accurate pricing is necessary but insufficient. We need to focus also
2011-2012 641
HeinOnline  -- 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 641 2011-2012
REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW
The fact that shadow banking is itself not well defined
inherently limits my analysis. I have attempted to define it tentatively
by identifying its overall scope and basic characteristics. Focusing on
those fundamentals, my analysis is more conceptual than applied. A
question for future inquiry will be the extent to which actual
regulation of shadow banking should more closely target specific fact
patterns. 104
My Address also does not purport to examine who should
regulate shadow banking. I merely note, in closing, that traditional
financial regulatory agencies tend to be compartmentalized, each
focusing on its specific mandate-for example, regulation of specific
types of financial institutions, such as banks; or regulation of specific
types of financial products, such as securities or derivatives.10 5
Because shadow banking cuts across these categories, its regulation
may well require a more holistic effort or, at least, better cross-
agency coordination than currently exists for financial regulation.
Thank you.
on how regulation can help to mitigate the harmful consequences of
mispricing and systemic failure. See supra Part IllB.
104 Cf supra note 88, and accompanying text (proposing actual regulation
tied to a particular fact pattern); E-mail from Dan Awrey, Univ. Lecturer in
Law & Finance, Univ. of Oxford, to author (Jan. 24, 2012, 12:18 PM)
(emphasis in original) (on file with author) (saying that he is "increasingly
of the view that the prevailing notion of 'shadow banking'-which throws a
number of divergent institutions, instruments and markets into the same
bucket-has become a meaningful obstacle to regulatory reform in a
number of key areas (esp. wholesale funding markets). There are many
different objects of (potential) regulation wrapped up in this definition, each
manifesting different issues and requiring different regulatory responses.").
1o5 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(b), 124 Stat.
1376, 1642-43 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302(b)) (dividing
regulatory jurisdiction for "swaps" and "security-based swaps" between the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Securities and Exchange
Commission, respectively).
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